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Abstract
Prior work has shown the strong presence of regional and spatial context in linkages
between regime characteristics and involvement in civil and international con°ict,
but no adequate statistical model has explicitly captured these forces. Models that
adequately re°ect the interdependence of actors and actions in world politics are faced
with di±cult problems of estimation since the classical likelihood becomes intractable
in the presence of the dependencies among observations. Most current solutions to
this problem are based on approaches that were developed decades ago during a period
of expensive computing. However, these approaches are no longer neither necessary
nor appropriate. Using data from 1988, we use an autologistic formulation, estimated
by Monte Carlo Markov Chain approximation, to extend our work exploring the link
between authority structures and peace, one of the most salient present research topics
in international relations. Our estimated model allows us to predict about half of the
violent domestic and international con°icts that emerged in the subsequent decade.
1 TRACKING THE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 2
1 Tracking the analysis of con°ict
The study of geography as a component of world politics has a checkered history.
The term geopolitics was introduced by a Swedish scholar and politician, Rudolf
Kjellen (1916) who applied Darwinian notions to the putative organic nature of states
imbued with an innate propensity for growth. Kjellen's theories gained considerable
in°uence and were instrumental in popularizing the term lebensraum which Friedrich
Ratzel (1879) introduced into the political dialogue in Europe in 1899 (Glassner 1993).
Kjellen's ideas were especially salient with a retired German general and university
professor, the director of the Munich Institute of Geopolitics and editor of Zeitschrift
fÄur Geopolitik, Karl Haushofer. One of Haushofer's most impressionable students was
Rudolf Hess. Hess, Hitler, and Haushofer had many long discussions, and the rest,
as they say, is history; Hitler's expansionist foreign policy was rationalized, if not
based, on the geopolitics as introduced by Ratzel, Kjellen, and especially Haushofer.
About this same time Sir Halford John Mackinder proposed a similar notion: the
heartland concept.1 Mackinder's Heartland Theory, suggests that there was a pivotal
area \in the closed heart-land of Euro-Asia" which was most likely to become the seat
of world power, because of its inaccessibility. Nicholas Spykman, a political scientist
who founded the Institute of International Studies at Yale, was an in°uential realist
who emphasized the control of Eurasian coastal regions (Rimland).
Despite its prominent place in the development of the ¯eld of world politics, the
legacy of World War II and the end of the colonial area left geopolitics rather out
of favor in policy circles. Though the geographical basis of military strategy has
received some interest in the ¯eld of strategic studies, geopolitics in the classical sense
has been con¯ned to political geographers.2 However, the idea that geography plays
and important role in international politics need not be limited by the its political
misuses.3 In fact, the analysis of the role of geography has gradually re-emerged, and
is working its way back into the scienti¯c study of world politics and foreign policy.
In this article we explore the properties of deadly con°icts from a spatial perspec-
tive to gain insight on how they have evolved grosso modo after the birth of modern
Europe in 1876, using techniques developed to study similar phenomenon in other
1mackinder's classic paper (1904) and his later summary (1919) have remained a more popular
and politically correct summary of the notion that a territorial imperative is \stabilizing":
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the heartland commands the World Island;
Who rules the World Island commands the World.
The National Anthem of England, Land of Hope and Glory (better known by its tune, Elgar's Pomp
and Circumstance March No. 1.), for example, extols the virtue of expansion in the following way:
\Wider and still wider, shall thy bounds be set".
2For a broad discussion see ¶O Tuathail (1996); Glassner (1993); and Taylor and Flint (1999).
3If you think these notions are ignored in contemporary Eurasian politics visit the web site of
Alexander Dugin at http://www.arctogaia.com.
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arenas. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of geography, only recently
have scholars begun to explore systematically international con°ict using a perspec-
tive that encourages understanding the context of con°ict from a spatial perspective.
Most of this work has not bene¯tted from the breakthroughs that have occurred in
the past three decades in the statistical analysis of spatial patterns. As yet, no pub-
lished studies incorporate the most recent modeling and statistical frameworks for
modeling spatial processes.
2 The statistical analysis of con°ict
Although the causes of war and peace have long generated interest among social
scientists, historians, and philosophers, the statistical analysis of war and peace is a
relatively novel endeavor. In this section we review the development of the statistical
analysis of con°ict and its relations to the spatial analysis of con°ict
2.1 Pioneers
Somewhat surprisingly, the ¯rst scholars to undertake systematic attempts at collect-
ing empirical data on con°ict were all from ¯elds other than international relations.
Initial data development e®orts were carried out by an historian, Quincy Wright
(1942), a sociologist, Pitrim Sorokin (1957), as well Lewis Fry Richardson (1960b), a
physicist turned meteorologist who later developed an interest in psychology.
Richardson went considerably further than the the other pioneers in terms of
statistical analysis. Based on the data he compiled on deadly quarrels, de¯ned as
events involving more than 35 casualties, Richardson analyzed whether the risk of
con°ict seemed related to factors such as shared language, religion, relative wealth,
poverty, and distance, and considered whether the distribution of outbreaks of con°ict
displayed evidence of contagion over time.
Richardson also took an interest in the spatial aspects of con°ict: He noted a
strong relationship between a state's propensity for con°ict and its number of borders.
He later expanded on this in an insightful theoretical essay on spatial topology and
how the shape of territorial entities would in°uence the opportunities for con°ict
(Richardson 1992).
Richardson's work, though written in the 1930s and 1940s, was not widely available
until the 1960s, and remained virtually unnoted by scholars of con°ict at the time.
In the 1960s, mathematical psychologists such as Rashevsky (1949) and Rapoport
(1963) revived Richardson's (1960a) model of action-reaction dynamics in armament
processes, and this lead to somewhat of a resurgence in interest and appreciation
of Richardson's work among statistically oriented scholars in international relations.
However, as pointed out by Hess (1995) and Nicholson (1999), Richardson remains
largely unknown among the mainstream of international relations. Political geogra-
phers and scholars of geopolitics appear to have ignored Richardson altogether.
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2.2 Settlers
The second wave of interest in statistical analysis of con°ict in the 1960s followed in
part ideas and suggestions found in the work of the pioneers. The behavioral revo-
lution in political science led to a more prominent position for systematic empirical
research and statistical analysis in international relations
Most of the contemporary work on con°ict has been in°uenced by the Correlates
of War project (commonly know as COW), founded at the University of Michigan by
J. David Singer in the 1960s. (Singer 1979; Singer 1980). The COW project started
collecting a comprehensive data set on armed con°ict (Singer and Small 1972; Small
and Singer 1982), classi¯ed as either interstate con°ict between nation states, civil
wars within states and extra-systemic imperial or colonial wars, where members of
the international system engage in con°ict with actors that COW did not consider
members of the international system.
Despite the broad view of \deadly quarrels" that was taken initially, most of the
subsequent empirical research has limited itself almost exclusively on interstate con-
°ict among nation states.4 Moreover, most of the extant research looks at con°ict,
especially international con°ict, through a lens that is constructed somewhat arti¯-
cially. Most studies of con°ict view it from one of three perspectives. At a monadic
level, either a country participates in a con°ict{or not{and has a duration, extent,
and scope of involvement in that con°ict. At a dyadic level, pairs of countries are
involved in a con°ict, with each node in the so-called dyad having certain con°ict
speci¯c characteristics. At the systemic level, con°ict can be judged by whether war
is taking place somewhere in system. Sometimes, the extent of con°ict is assessed by
the share of countries or dyads that are deemed to be involved in con°ict. In this
way, deadly quarrels have been ¯ltered, deconstructed, and reconstructed to match
extant and (slowly) evolving databases and data-analysis strategies.
The original research in the COW project was particularly interested in examin-
ing the relationships postulated in \classical international relations theory" linking
con°ict to attributes of the international system itself - such as the number of poles
or distribution of military capabilities. However, few, if any, robust generalities have
between system attributes and con°ict have emerged.
In recognition that war is a process or outcome of interaction among decision-
makers in states, one main thrust of current research is to focus on dyads or pairs of
countries, and examine whether sets of covariates associated with theories of con°ict
behavior seem to a®ect the observed likelihood of con°ict at the margin (Bremer and
Cusack 1995; Most and Starr 1989).
Even though the behavioral trust of the dyadic approach has been somewhat more
successful strategy for empirical research, its track record is nonetheless rather mixed,
with a large number of \non-¯ndings" or no strong systematic relationships. There
seems, for example, to be no general, stable relationship between the distribution of
4In Gleditsch and Ward (2000a) we address this issue more completely.
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power and the propensity of dyadic con°ict. Nor do arms race processes between
states seem strongly associated with outbreaks of war. Many of the strongest empir-
ical regularities obtain for historical or geographical covariates; Countries are more
likely to ¯ght other proximate states, and con°icts are likely to spread geographically
across borders or recur between parties over time.
3 Toward a new geopolitics of deadly quarrels
We believe that a return to Richardson's notion of deadly quarrels and his focus on
the spatial aspects of con°ict has much to o®er both in terms of improving theories
of con°ict and furthering empirical research. In the following, we ¯rst discuss why
we believe an exclusive focus on interstate con°ict as de¯ned by the COW project
may be overly limiting. Based on our previous work on democratization and war, we
then show how explicitly incorporating space can contribute to furthering empirical
research on con°ict.
3.1 (Re-)de¯ning con°ict
There is a strong tendency in international relations to assume that it is self-evident
what would constitute violent con°ict and not. Most applied researchers tend to
assume that the commonly used data probably by and large will accurately re°ect
their theoretical concepts. To be sure, scholars generally acknowledge that there may
be large amounts of measurement error. But such error would be merely random
noise and essentially wash out in the aggregate, provided there are no systematic
sources of bias and misleading attributions. The availability of the COW interstate
war data has enabled researchers to proceed to analyze data on con°ict without too
much concern about de¯ning the events of interest. In the following, we discuss some
non-trivial problems indicating that measurement in the study of con°ict often seems
out of touch with our general understanding of what the concept entails.
The term con°ict denotes some form of incompatibility between parties. Most
de¯nitions stress incompatibility which is explicitly perceived by the parties involved,
rather than contrary goals based upon some form of objective function of the actors'
interest or the structure of their relationship.5 Boulding (1963, 5), for example, de¯nes
con°ict as \a situation of competition in which the parties{of which there are at least
two {are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions, and in which each
party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other."
Although some degree of con°ict may be inherent in any social relation, researchers
usually draw a fundamental distinction between violent and non-violent forms of
con°ict, and focus on overt resort to violence and its absence. Violence is, of course,
5Concepts such as structural violence (see H¿ivik and Galtung (1971) for an example) generated
considerable interest in the 1960s and 1970s, but is not central in current research.
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by no means the only way of in°icting punitive measures, and ¯nal resort to violence
is arguably the result of larger processes that may or may not lead to violence. It
is thus desirable to distinguish between qualitatively di®erent forms of \no-war" in
statistical analysis (Gleditsch 1999).
Violent social con°ict must furthermore be distinguished from other interpersonal
violence. The former encompasses hostile interactions between some reasonably well-
de¯ned set of parties or actors that involve violence above some magnitude and which
persist for some period of time. Domestic or urban violence may a®ect a larger number
of persons directly than interstate con°ict, but would not be considered social con°ict
as neither perpetrators nor victims constitute actors or parties in the sense of a uni¯ed
group.6To ensure tractability, most introduce some threshold of violence for something
to constitute evidence of con°ict. For our purposes, the Correlates of War criterion
of more than 1,000 battle deaths for something to constitute a \major war" provides
a reasonable approach to delineating violent armed con°ict (Singer and Small 1982,
1972).7
Unlike much of other contemporary research, we ¯nd it limiting to restrict atten-
tion to con°ict between nation states only. Interstate con°ict is a relatively limited
share of the armed con°ict involving nation states. According to Wallensteen and
Sollenberg (1998), only six out of 103 armed con°icts in the period 1989-97 were
strictly interstate con°icts (see also Holsti 1996: 22). Some argue that the relative
share of \civil" versus \international" con°ict has increased over the 20th century.
We have strong doubts about the accuracy of data on civil war (say, in Africa) at the
beginning of the century. However, any increase in civil wars nonetheless seems to
run counter to what one would expect from the proliferation of states over the period,
which would suggest that civil wars might be converted to interstate wars.
If our broader substantive interest as political scientists is understanding what
conditions underlie the violence that aggravates and threatens the health and well
being of millions of individuals, it is not obvious why we should restrict our focus
exclusively to a small subset. Even at a time when many see the world approaching
something akin to an end of international war, the extent of warfare in the interna-
tional system and its consequences still seem substantial. The consequences of nuclear
war might be catastrophic, yet, very simple weapons have claimed vastly more lives
than than nuclear missiles. In our view, the most common justi¯cations for the ex-
clusive focus on interstate con°ict in research on con°ict do not seem su±ciently
substantiated.
6Similarly, acts of \democide" or a government violence against its own population would gener-
ally not be considered social con°ict, because the victims do not constitute a group. Rummel (1995)
estimates that democide have claimed ¯ve times more casualties than international wars in the 20th
century.
7We thus limit ourselves to the COW international and civil war data set rather than so-called
militarized disputes which include events below this level of casualties. We ¯nd the so-called MID
data problematic (Gleditsch 1999, ch. 4), moreover this data only includes disputes between states.
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3.2 The internationalized nature of deadly quarrels
That states constitute the principal actors is somewhat of an article of faith in the
¯eld of international relations. Much of international relations theory holds relations
between states to be fundamentally di®erent from relations within formally sovereign
states given the condition of anarchy and absence of formal authority. Although the
question is rarely addressed explicitly, researchers tend to be skeptical as to whether
theories of international con°ict are applicable to con°ict within countries or transna-
tional con°ict involving both state and non-state entities.
A probably not fully intended side e®ect of the assumption of sovereignty is that
most researchers simply assume that sovereignty is e®ective within nations, thereby
making civil war qualitatively di®erent from interstate con°ict. Yet, sovereignty is
obviously less than fully e®ective within many existing states, and similar problems of
enforcement and contracting under anarchy could obtain within states as well. When
relating \Warre" to anarchy, Hobbes had relations within states in mind, not the
international system.
Restricting analyzes to interstate wars is in practice more problematic than often
assumed by practitioners in the sense that researchers seem unaware of what events
become excluded. In the COW terminology, international wars encompass in addition
to interstate wars also extra-systemic wars, in which system members engage in war
with a political entity not considered to be a system member. Many armed con°icts in
the postwar era, however, are classi¯ed as \civil wars" with outside intervention rather
than interstate wars. Events regarded as internal or \civil" wars such as Afghanistan,
Angola, Lebanon, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, nonetheless display obvious international
dimensions.
Whether something is judged to be an external or internal con°ict in retrospect is
quite sensitive to legal and de¯nitional aspects in themselves unrelated to properties
of the con°ict. The Vietnam war, for example, is regarded as an international war
once the United States intervenes, having been previously classi¯ed as a civil war that
grows out of an initial extra-systemic war involving France prior to independence.
More generally, a con°ict becomes an international or civil war depending on how
the con°ict and foreign intervention unfolds. As intervention often occurs in connec-
tion with attempts to replace the existing government, the outcome of interventions
or which party is considered to be the legitimate government at the time of interven-
tion can \determine" whether an intervention involves interstate war or constitutes
international intervention in an ongoing civil con°ict. If the anticommunist Herat
uprising in Afghanistan had succeeded in actually toppling the government, a So-
viet intervention could conceivably have become an event marking the onset of an
interstate war.8 Additional ambiguities arise as to whether con°icts revolving around
the breakup of entities and the emergence of new states as seen as in the former
Yugoslavia constitute wars between sovereign nations or \internal" wars.
8The 1956 invasion of Hungary, for example, is considered an interstate war.
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Upon closer scrutiny, lists of interstate wars cover only a subset of what observers
perceive as armed con°ict and war. Merely a cursory view indicate that many scholars
seem unaware of these implications. Mans¯eld and Snyder's (1995) work on democra-
tization and war, for example, repeatedly refers to con°icts in the former Soviet Union
and the Balkans to illustrate their argument. However, neither Chechnya nor Bosnia
are considered international wars, and are as such not included in the empirical data
that they rely on. Mans¯eld and Snyder (1997) similarly cite Rwanda as evidence of
how democratization leads to war, though this is a \civil war" not included in their
empirical analysis limited to international wars. Our aim is not to single out par-
ticular research. However, these examples indicate that large discrepancies between
theory and data are quite widespread in research on international con°ict.
Our argument is not so much that the COW classi¯cations are \wrong" or that
civil and extra-systemic wars are fully equivalent to interstate wars. However, this
terminology might impose a distinction that is theoretically untenable. If this par-
tition gained a great deal, such a tradeo® may be worth the cost. Our view is that
the limitations far outweigh the gains. Civil wars carry a potential for di®usion and
escalation to interstate wars, and are classi¯ed as one or the other based in part on
whether they do or not. Such classi¯cation problems underscore why limiting con°ict
to clear-cut cases of interstate war fails to fully correspond to the general phenomenon
of interest. To understand regional formations of con°ict and peace, \civil" con°icts
which contribute to regional insecurity cannot merely be excluded out of hand.
The standard formal model of con°ict as interaction between two parties X and Y
has come to be identi¯ed with states, and does not always translate easily to situations
with constellations of other types of actors. However, a simpli¯cation or abstraction
which we invoke in a modeling device is not necessarily an appropriate theoretical
criteria for de¯ning con°ict or a suitable empirical case selection device.
Taking a broader view of con°icts as violent events that have various degrees of
international dimensions and implications, we relax the criterion that both of the
principal opposing parties must be system members We consider all events in the
Correlates of War international and civil war data as indicators of whether a country
participates in violent con°ict. Although the original COW data are available only
up to 1992, we have updated them to 1998 using information from Wallensteen and
Sollenberg (1999).
We identify outbreaks of new con°icts by the COW classi¯cations as to what con-
stitutes separate con°icts. We recognize that it is di±cult to identify what constitutes
a new con°ict and that successive events may not be entirely independent.
3.2.1 The meaning of y=1 in studies of con°ict
The decisions above do not solve all the ambiguities in data on con°ict. Most notably,
it is clear that the condition \state A is involved in war at time t" being true could
mean a variety of di®erent things. Not all incidents of con°ict participation seem
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equivalent or symmetric between the parties.
A given incident of con°ict which a country is involved in may take place either
on (i) a country's own territory (or in the immediate proximity) or (ii) outside its
own regional context. The consequences of con°ict and the element of threat to a
state's vital security and territory di®er considerably with the speci¯c location.
Consider the case of the Vietnam war, where the US becomes involved in a civil
war between the two Vietnams growing out of a colonial war with France. However,
the con°ict was fought entirely in Indochina, and a®ected North and South Vietnam
in a very di®erent ways than the US. Although the US may de¯ne its security interest
to encompass objectives beyond its regional context, it was spared most of the physical
destruction and the risk of the con°ict spreading to the US territory or home turf
was essentially minimal. Similarly, Cuba commits large number of troops in support
of the MPLA government in the civil war in Angola, but no civil war is taking place
on Cuba itself.
These problems become more severe when we are interested in the spatial aspects
of con°ict. The prospects for di®usion of con°ict are greater the closer a state is
to the actual locus on con°ict. The recent events in Kosovo clearly involves a risk
of violent con°ict in Macedonia. Spanish forces participating in UN operations in
Kosovo, however, would not be expected to lead to di®usion to Morocco.
The existing COW data tell us on what continents con°ict is waged. Ideally,
however, our data on con°ict would include disaggregated information on extension
and location of the various battles.
3.3 Di®usion of con°ict
Many have hypothesized that con°icts may spread or di®use over time and among
countries across space. Richardson examined whether outbreaks of war seemed to
be randomly distributed events by comparing his data to a Poisson distribution.
Richardson found that the distribution seemed within the range of variation that
could be expected under a Poisson distribution, and concluded that con°icts seemed
to be random over time. He also discarded other arguments about secular trends on
the basis of similar probabilistic reasoning.
However, it would be incorrect to conclude that Richardson considered con°icts
entirely random phenomena. Richardson (1960b, 176-183, 288) observed a strong 0.7
correlation between a country's number of borders and its extent of war involvement,
which he attributed to the opportunities for contact. He further explored the relation-
ship between contiguity and con°ict through mathematical models, and noted that
existing political division of the world displayed several regularities or \remarkable
political facts" not mandated by the geometry of closed polyhedra. Almost no coun-
tries are completely surrounded by another, and almost every vertex (or points where
more than two entities meet) has the simplest possible structure, consisting either of
three countries or two countries meeting water (1960b, 290-1). Though Richardson
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is not explicit on this point, he seems to recognize that this simplicity of structure
is not incidental, but has resulted as the outcome of political processes. \Simple"
territorial structures are generally more compact, and thus easier to defend or fortify
than complex shaped territory.
The later settlers ¯rst approached di®usion by examining whether the distrib-
ution of outbreaks of con°ict conformed to statistical distribution for independent
events such as the Poisson distribution. Davis, Duncan, and Siverson (1978) exam-
ined di®usion of con°ict over time on the system level, or whether outbreaks of war
tended to be followed by an increased likelihood of subsequent outbreaks of war. In
general, however, most concorded with Richardson on that outbreaks seemed to be
indistinguishable from a random process.
The weak evidence for di®usion from this line of research seems at odds with
casual evidence of di®usion. Most and Starr (1980) noted several di±culties with
the \does-the-outbreaks-of-war-conform-to-a-Poisson-distribution?" approach. Such
tests against a nil model of independence say little about the speci¯c form of depen-
dence hypothesized to exist between observations if the model should be rejected.
Most and Starr (1980, 933) delineated a series of possible positive and negative de-
pendent relationship between war outbreak and participation over space and time.
Di®usion may induce positive or negative reinforcement of con°ict involvement,
making future war participation more likely, as suggested by the concept of\enduring
rivalries", or less likely, as suggested by \weariness of war" hypotheses. However, wars
may also di®use between nations so that an outbreak of war in one country increases
(or decreases) the subsequent likelihood of outbreaks of wars in other countries. Most
and Starr examined such positive and negative spatial di®usion by testing empirically
whether new cases of war participation were more likely to occur in countries with
warring border nations. Using a series of di®erent data sets on con°ict, they found
that the presence of warring border nations indeed appeared to increase the likelihood
of war.
The di®usion through \war in bordering nations" research program has con-
tributed to international relations research by clarifying some of the opportunities
and constraints for interaction and the spatial dependence between units. It taught
us that the spatial correlation of con°ict seems to be strong. Most and Starr (1980,
936) pointed out that spatial non-dependence would have statistical consequences
similar to serial correlation in time, and suggested that the lack of attention to spa-
tial dependence or di®usion of con°ict could have lead to biased results and impeded
progress in research on the causes of war. However, Most and Starr and later con-
tributors did not provide adequate statistical models for dealing with the spatial
correlation.
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3.4 Towards a geography of violent con°ict
Later statistical research on di®usion and the spatial aspects of con°ict and cooper-
ation was strongly in°uenced by approaches developed in regional science. The so-
called spatial econometric approach surveyed by Anselin (1988) popularized introduc-
ing spatial context in statistical models through a matrix speci¯cation of dependence
between entities and a \spatial lag" term that accounts for the spatial correlation
of the dependent variable. This is based upon work now 25 years old (Besag and
Moran 1975; Ord 1975) that demonstrates how the computational di±culties with
the maximum likelihood estimator for autoregressive models for spatial interaction
could be solved by a simpli¯ed computational scheme based on a trick involving the
eigenvalues of the spatial weights matrix too arcane to discuss.
These approaches have been used in several studies (O'Loughlin 1986; Kirby and
Ward 1987; Ward and Kirby 1987; Shin and Ward 1999). However, the framework
has a series of drawbacks for studies of con°ict. This class of models have been devel-
oped for continuous dependent variables, whereas most data on con°ict is categorical,
typically binary.9 Even though models for spatially correlated categorical variables
have been developed over the past three decades in the statistical analysis of spatial
patterns (Besag 1972; Besag 1974), the work of con°ict has not bene¯tted from these
breakthroughs that have occurred. Estimation has usually been based on computa-
tional methods that initially were introduced as convenient solutions for seemingly
intractable problems, but no longer seem necessary.
4 Democracy, con°ict, and peace
In this section we present a brief overview of the evolution in previous research of
the model we propose to analyze. The seeming absence of war between democracies
was ¯rst noted by Babst, but what has later become known as the democratic peace
entered into the mainstream of empirical research on international con°ict through
a series of articles by Rummell and the controversies it generated. The democratic
peace has provided a boost to empirical research and generated interest in numerous
related propositions.
In a series of papers (Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Gleditsch and Ward 2000c), we
have re-examined the controversy surrounding whether democratization is associated
with improved prospects or greater risk of war as suggested by Mans¯eld and Snyder
(1995).10 Mans¯eld and Snyder (1995) aggregated changes in authority structures
over a ten-year period, and examined whether democratization seemed to be as-
sociated with incidents of con°ict in the subsequent ten years through Â2 tests of
9We leave aside the question of whether con°ict is inherently discrete events or more contin-
uous phenomena. Even if con°icts can di®er greatly in degree, most classi¯cation opt for coding
presence/absence.
10For other contributions, see Thompson and Tucker (1997) and Enterline (1998).
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independence.
In light of some of the problems in this tabular analysis approach, Ward and Gled-
itsch (1998) proposed examining the likelihood of con°ict as a function of changes in
authority structures over a prior ten-year period. Instead of dichotomizing \change"
versus \no-change," they proposed disaggregating changes into their direction or sign,
magnitude of change, and variability of change or the variance in authority structure
over the period. The results indicated that substantial democratization would reduce
the likelihood of war, whereas smaller changes or transitions to democracy that are
followed by reversals to autocracy could increase the risk of war.
4.1 War and peace in time and space
Ward and Gleditsch (1998), essentially ignored any dependence between the pooled
observations, both over time and across space. Gleditsch and Ward (2000c) and
Gleditsch (1999) estimated revised versions of the original model to address these
issues.
Gleditsch and Ward (2000c) examined the duration dependence of war and peace
over time as well as investigated the e®ects of democratization on outbreaks and con-
tinuation/termination of wars separately. In addition, the model was revised in an
attempt to take into account dependence across units in space. First, we evaluated
the extent of clustering of con°ict. If con°ict is distrubuted non-randomly in space,
statistical models ignoring di®usion or the dependence of war and peace among coun-
tries could be ridden by serially correlated error terms. Second, we considered whether
con°ict was related to the extent of democracy in neighboring countries. Gleditsch
(1999) found that the likelihood of con°ict for a given country seemed more consis-
tently related to the authority structures in the larger surrounding region than the
attributes of each individual country.
Space was treated as ¯xed in these studies, however, though the number of states
in the system and their proximity and borders change quite considerable between 1875
and the contemporary era. Gleditsch and Ward (2000c) tested explicitly whether the
relationship of the continuous variables to the likelihood of the event occuring seemed
linear in log odds through a Generalized Additive Model speci¯cation. Their results
indicate that though many of the e®ects did not seem fully linear in the log odds,
only the e®ects of democracy displayed monotonicity.
In the next section we focus on two basic aspects of this model: the negative
impact of high levels of democracy on con°ict propensity and the contagion e®ects of
con°icts in surrounding regions.
5 A Parsimonious Model of Democracy and War
The basic insight we propose herein is that state i's probability of con°ict is highly
dependent upon the existence of con°ict in all other states ¡i. Curiously, such in-
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terdependence is typically lacking in empirical models of international relations and
world politics.
Our basic model is an autologistic model of the likelihood that a state i will be
involved in a con°ict at time t. We specify the dependencies between the N countries
in our sample by a binary N £N distance based connectivity matrix, where entries
Wi;j acquire a value of 1 if states i and j are considered adjacent or \close". We
generate the W matrix from a new data set on the minimum distances between
polities in the international system (Gleditsch and Ward 2000b). Two independent
covariates capture the level of democracy and the regional context of democracy: di;t
the level of democracy at time t in country i for all countries (1; : : : ; n), ranging from
¡10 for highly autocratic to +10 for highly democratic and d0i;tW s, the average level
of democracy in contiguous countries, with W s denoting a connectivity matrix W
that has been row standardized.
A simple, linear statement of these independent aspects to which an intercept ®
and a spatial covariate y0iW are added is given as
®+ ¯1di + ¯2d
0
iW
s + °y0iW
where y0iW is the sum of neighbors in con°ict for a given de¯nition of neighbors
contained in the contiguity matrix, W .
Collecting into ´i the k exogenous terms in a k £ i matrix of exogenous variables
Xi, and the associated parameters into a vector ~¯k, and de¯ning the neighborhood
sum or spatial lag, y0iW , as eyi, yields
´i = ®+ X
0
i
~¯
k + ° eyi
which permits a simple statement of the autologistic:
Pr[yi = 1j eyi] = e´i
1 + e´i
(1)
If ° = 0 this is a standard logistic; if all ¯k are 0, this becomes the standard autol-
ogistic without covariates. The autologistic model is widely known in statistics and
has been widely used for applications in ecology and natural science, but appears to
have been completely ignored in the social sciences.
It is widely know that this model has a likelihood function which is mathematically
intractable since the yi are conditionally dependent upon each other (Besag 1974).
Three computational methods have been proposed to solve this problem. Besag
(1974) devised a coding method that reduced the dependencies to a few adjacencies,
assuming all other observations are independent and exchangeable. The resulting
scheme permits maximum likelihood estimation. This method is ine±cient and is
little used in practice (e.g., Hu®er and Wu 1998). A maximum pseudolikelihood
method was developed (Besag 1975) that uses a weighted average of di®erent coding
methods, and its e±ciency examined (Hu®er and Wu 1998; Besag 1977; Besag and
5 A PARSIMONIOUS MODEL OF DEMOCRACY AND WAR 14
Moran 1975). This has been found to be ine±cient, especially when spatial interaction
is strong.
The third class of estimation approaches is Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods. These approaches originate in statistical physics.11 These methods are com-
putationally intensive and allow one to approximate maximum likelihood estimates
for any family of distributions with probability densities known up to a constant of
proportionality. This approach has been widely and recently used in image recogni-
tion/reconstruction (Hoeting, Leecaster and Bowden 1999) as well as parameter esti-
mation (Gumpertz, Wu and Pye 1999; Gumpertz, Graham and Ristaino 1997; Gotway
and Stroup 1997).
In our earlier work, in particular Gleditsch and Ward (2000c), we employed a ver-
sion of the pseudolikelihood approach to estimation. One major disadvantage of this
approach is that it tends not to work in the situations which we are most interested
in studying: strong spatial patterns. More recently, however, it has become possi-
ble to use simulation approaches {namely the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method{ to get approximations that are closer to the full likelihood function.
The basic approach introduced in Geyer and Thompson (1992) is quite simple in
conception and has been used by Wu and Hu®er (1998) as well as Hoeting, Leecaster,
and Bowden (1999). If ~µ = (®; ~¯k; °), then a probability measure of a random map
generated from this model forms an exponential family de¯ned by the parameters ~µ
and the su±cient statistics, ~s(y), given by
~s(y) =
µ nX
i=1
yi;
nX
i=1
Xiyi;
1
2
nX
i=1
~yi
¶
:
For any chosen vector of parameters corresponding to µ, say Ã, a sample of maps
containing simulated values for yi can be obtained. Typically, the pseudolikelihood
estimates of the parameters are used for Ã. A Gibbs sampler (Geman and Geman
1984) is then used for data augmentation generating a large set of samples based on Ã.
These simulated samples are then used to derive a set of su±cient statistics. Using the
su±cient statistics from these samples it is possible to determine an approximation
to the likelihood function for µ based on the approximation found in the sample. The
Markov Chain maximum likelihood, found through these approximations, is obtained
by solving the score equation, typically by use of Newton-Raphson methods:Pm
j=1 ~s(ym)e
(µ^¡Ã)0~s(ym)Pm
j=1 e
(µ^¡Ã)0~s(ym)
= ~s(yobserved) (2)
where m is the number of sampled simulated maps and ~s() is the vector of su±cient
statistics.12
11Alan Sokal (1996), of Social Text fame, has written a good overview of the foundations and
algorithms with applications to physics. See Gelman et alia (1995) for an accessible introduction in
the context of Bayesian methods.
12Newton-Raphson methods are a crude, iterative way to minimize a function modulo a set of
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5.1 Empirical results
We examine this simple model for data from 1988, taken from Polity 98 and a W
matrix using a 475 km minimum distance threshold. Pseudolikelihood and MCMC
estimates of the parameters can be found in Table 1. This is an exceedingly parsimo-
nious model with only two covariates: the level of democracy in a country and the
average level of democracy in the surrounding countries. We have kept the model
quite simple to provide a di±cult test for the autologistic formulation. This should
enable us to see how much information exists in the spatial distribution of con°ict
itself and further enable us to examine its di®usion.
In general the MCMC estimates (µ^) are smaller than the corresponding pseudo-
likelihood estimates (Ã^). MCMC standard errors are quite small for each estimate.
As would be expected, democracy shows a strong negative e®ect on the probability
of con°ict, while the spatial context of con°ict shows evidence of strong spatial cor-
relation. The spatial context of democracy is very close to zero, with a fairly large
standard error; by traditional standards this would not be seen to be a powerful
covariate. In short, all other things being set aside as \controlled for," democracy
in°uences a robust negative in°uence on the likelihood that a country will be involved
in a domestic or international con°ict of substantial magnitude. At the same time,
there is a stronger, independent (same scale) locational e®ect. Countries that are
surrounded by con°ictual countries will also have a much higher likelihood of being
involved in a con°ict, either civil or international.
Table 1: MCMC and Pseudolikelihood Parameter Estimates
Spatial Parameters
Intercept Democracy Democracy Con°ict
Estimator ® ¯1 ¯2 °
MCMC Maximum Likelihood µ^ -1.712 -0.053 -0.003 0.261
Pseudolikelihood Ã^ -1.840 -0.020 0.013 0.298
MCMC ¾^ 0.0601 0.0061 0.0099 0.0133
It has been noted that many studies of international con°ict have fairly low predic-
tive capabilities. Beck, King and Zheng (2000) have argued that virtually no studies
of international con°ict have predicted probabilities greater than the typical thresh-
old used in many other ¯elds, ¼^ > :5. This is true for the pseudolikelihood estimates
shown above. However, the MCMC estimates that we provide do in fact exceed this
parameters µ. The basic iteration is given by: µi+1 = µ ¡ G¡1(µi)g(µi), with g(µi) a vector of
derivatives of f with respect to the µi and G(µi) is the m£m matrix of second derivatives of f .This
method is very fast if it begins close to the minimum, but slow and thorny if it doesn't: G may
in such cases become negative de¯nite. \May" means \does" in this context. Newton-Raphson
algorithms also can produce exploding parameter vectors as well as cyclical results.
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threshold (see Table 2) in 7 of the 138 cases, admittedly a small proportion, but
certainly not an empty set. Moreover, of the seven con°icts that are postdicted, two
of them are actual con°icts that did occur. Iraq and Syria both were involved in
con°ict in 1988. Figure 1 presents the probability density for the estimates from the
autologistic model.
Table 2: Actual and Predicted Con°ict States
Observed
Predicted No Yes
No 109 29
Yes 5 2
Figure 1: Density Function for Predicted Probability of Con°ict
Predicted Probability
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However such a comparison leaves unincorporated any errors that might be intro-
duced by the model itself, and is therefore not an adequate re°ection of the model's
predictive power. We conduct a simulation, using the estimate µ^ to produce estimates,
but instead of using the observed data on con°ict (i.e., the data that were used in
generating the estimates) we allow con°ict values to be produced by the model on the
°y.13 This requires a starting value for con°ict. We use the current state of con°ict
in 1988. The model is then simulated and con°ict is turned on or o® in each country
based on the autologistic equation. Then the simulated current state of con°ict is
13Based on Figure 1 we use 0:4 as a cut-o® value for predicting con°ict.
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used as input values, and the process is repeated until it settles down, usually after
several iterations. Table 3 shows that such a dynamic use of the estimate coe±cients,
produces somewhat stronger results in addition to being more faithful to the autol-
ogistic formulation. In this instance, we are able to correctly predict eight con°icts,
and have an equal number of false positives.
Table 3: Actual and Predicted Con°ict States 1988
Observed
Predicted No Yes
No 99 23
Yes 8 8
Finally, we use the estimated parameters for 1988 (µ^) along with the data on
democracy and the spatial lag of democracy for 1988 to predict the state of con°ict in
the subsequent decade to 1998, using a cut-o® value of 0:35 obtained from inspecting
the density function. We are basically predicting whether there will be a domestic or
international con°ict in the next ten years, based on knowledge about the current state
of con°ict in all countries, coupled with knowledge of whether they are democracies
or autocracies in 1988.
Table 4: Using 1988 Estimates to Predict Con°ict from 1988 through 1998
Observed
Predicted No Yes
No 73 29
Yes 8 26
As shown in Table 4 there are twenty six successful predictions of con°ict (along
with 73 successful predictions of no con°ict), tempered by eight false predicted con-
°icts and twenty nine missed con°icts. Stated di®erently, the simple autologistic
model estimated on the 1988 data classi¯es about 75 percent of the annual obser-
vations in the subsequent year correctly. More interestingly, it successfully classi¯es
almost 50 percent of the con°icts. The correctly classi¯ed con°icts are listed in Ta-
ble 5.14
14Our model misses cases of war participation for Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Cambodia,
Canada, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, France, Guinea-Bissau, India, Italy, Liberia, Liberia, Mo-
rocco, Myanmar, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Rumania, Russia, South Africa, Sierra
Leone, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe. In many of
these cases (e.g., UK) con°ict was not actually waged on the state's own territory. Some countries
involved in war in the period did not exist in 1988 (e.g., Bosnia), and are as such not part of the
prediction set.
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Table 5: Pro¯le of Correctly Predicted Con°icts
Country Type of War Date of Onset
Bahrain International 1991
Burundi Civil 1988, 1991, 1998
Chad International
Congo-Brazzaville Civil 1997
Democratic Republic of Congo { Zaire Civil 1997
Egypt International 1991
Ethiopia International 1998
Iran International
Iraq Civil, International 1991
Israel Civil
Kuwait International 1991
Lebanon Civil
Libya International
Nigeria Civil 1992, 1994, 1996
Oman International 1991
Qatar International 1991
Rwanda Civil 1990, 1998
Saudi-Arabia International 1991
Somalia Civil
Sudan Civil 1995
Syria Civil, International 1991
Tanzania Civil
Turkey Civil 1991
United Arab Emirates International 1991
Uganda Civil
Yemen Civil 1994
These results seem quite promising, but should not be cited as evidence of the
ability to predict war and turmoil. The model is very preliminary, containing only
one powerful covariate, ignoring many other forces that are known to be important.
At the same time it fails to predict con°ict in the majority of cases where con°ict
emerges. Wars are relatively rare events so that results could be quite erratic from
one time period to another. In the longer run, the evolution of hostility and con°ict
as well as appeasing factors must be incorporated explicitly in the model.
Despite these limitations, to our knowledge this e®ort is unique in successfully
bringing a strategic interaction perspective into a predictive mode for a large number
of cases. Our results clearly demonstrate that a rejection of the notion that all in-
ternational actors are sovereign and independent still permits considerable statistical
investigation of the patterns of international con°ict. To our knowledge it is also
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unique in its success rate in predicting con°ict, ex post ante.
6 Conclusion
International relations proclaims to study the interdependence of the forces in world
politics, especially countries and organizations. However, virtually all scholarship
that is statistically based has made the assumption that all countries are exchangeable
(Ward 1988) and their data are statistically independent. This has blinded us to the
substantial evidence of associative interactions in world politics.
Anselin (1988) and LeSage (1999) so-called spatial econometrics, using the insights
from Besag and Moran (1975) and Ord (1975) to circumvent the computing prob-
lems involved with complicated likelihood functions, was a fundamental breakthrough
which allowed likelihood estimates to be computed without solving the Jacobian ma-
trix for each observation for each iteration. A quarter of a century ago, Besag for-
mulated the pseudolikelihood approach to estimating parameters for the autologistic
formulation. This was necessary since the likelihood function of this speci¯cation was
mathematically intractable, owing to the fact that everything is dependent on every-
thing else. However, this pseudolikelihood approach for binary variables remained
ignored in political science and geography until very recently.
In the era of expensive computing both of these computational solutions made
sense. Two things have happened in the nonce, however. First, computers are now
surpassing the 1 GigaHertz speed marks. Computing and memory, as well as object
oriented languages, have made computationally intensive methods very a®ordable
and readily available. At the same time, the growth of MCMC approaches to solv-
ing di±cult likelihood functions has allowed researchers to undertake the analysis of
problems that were previously too di±cult to tackle. As a result of these two trends,
the old tricks are no longer relevant and may in fact serve to give us the wrong an-
swers as well as point us in the wrong direction. The range of opportunities for a
full-°edged spatial approach to deadly quarrels (and other discrete and continuous
social phenomena) is clearly very wide and the potential bene¯ts seem substantial,
judging from these simple steps.
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